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PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
maximum prison term of four years.6 8
Schick wanted to avoid the restriction of the President's pardoning
power by Congress. However, in doing so, the Court allowed the ex-
ecutive branch to exercise powers that were vested in Congress. The
Court had previously stated that "the authority to define and fix the
punishment for crime is legislative . . .and . . . the right to relieve
from punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to methods
by it provided, belongs to the executive department."69 More recently
the Court stated that "[t]he punishment appropriate for the diverse
"170federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress ....
The Court could have permitted both branches to exercise their given
functions, had it recognized the right of Congress to define the outer
boundaries of the President's pardoning power.
In light of this intrusion of the executive branch into the legislative
domain, it is unfortunate that Schick did not clarify the actual basis for
its holding. The Court announced that its decision was grounded in
the "history of the English pardoning power. '71 Nevertheless, an ex-
amination of the decision shows that the Court's conclusions deviated
from the common-law principles significantly. Rather than attempting
to invoke the common law, the Court could have openly announced that
it was abandoning an historical approach and was basing its decision
on currently existing conditions. The Court then could have proceeded
to enumerate the considerations upon which it based its conclusion that
the President has the right to prescribe and impose punishments on in-
dividuals without either the prisoners' consent or the Congress' author-
ization. Such an approach would have illuminated both the scope of
the President's pardoning power and the nature of his relation to
Congress.
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process in Prison Discipli-
nary Proceedings-The Supreme Court Responds
Most correctional systems reduce an inmate's sentence as a re-
ward for serving periods of his confinement without incurring dis-
68. Id.
69. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
70. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).
71. 95 S. CL at 385.
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ciplinary sanctions.1 These same correctional systems often revoke
this "good-time" credit as punishment for major violations of prison
rules. 2 Alternatively, prison authorities may restrict the inmate to a
disciplinary cell-commonly known as solitary confinement.3
In Wolff v. McDonnella the United States Supreme Court recently
determined that the imposition of either of these punishments is so
serious a deprivation of liberty that the inmate must be accorded the
constitutional protections of due process.5 In so ruling the Court also
prescribed the minimum procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy
due process in prison disciplinary proceedings. 6 Even though this
decision appears to enhance prisoners' rights, the minimum proce-
dures required in Wolff may not be sufficient to prevent arbitrary
action by state prison authorities.
THE CASE
Robert 0. McDonnell, an inmate at a Nebraska prison, filed a
complaint on behalf of himself and other inmates for damages and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He alleged that the
prison's disciplinary procedures, which might result in confinement
in a disciplinary cell or loss of good-time, violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
1. Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Actions, 2 LOYOLA U. or
CHICAGO LJ. 110, 111 & n.8 (1971).
2. See, e.g., N.C. STATE CORCTIONS SERVICE, GUIDEBOOK § 2-408(b) (3)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDEBOOk].
3. Note, 2 LOYOLA U. OF CHiCAGO LJ., supra note 1, at 111. "This 'prison within
a prison' usually is a place of solitary confinement, sometimes without bedding or toilet
facilities, accompanied by reduced diet and limited access to reading materials or other
diversions, and occasionally without any kind of light." THE UNITED STATES PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 50 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].
4. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
5. Id. at 558, 571-72 n.19.
6. Id. at 563-72. In recent years the question of what procedural safeguards are
demanded in prison disciplinary proceedings has occupied the time of many lower fed-
eral courts and has produced a variety of results. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Braxton
v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479
F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971).
7. In addition, McDonnell alleged that the inmate legal assistance program did
not meet constitutional standards and that the regulations governing inmates' mall were
unconstitutionally restrictive. 418 U.S. at 543. This note will not deal with the issues
raised by these allegations.
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The district court denied relief,8 but the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed9 on the due process claim. The court of appeals
held that due process rights must be provided and that the procedural
safeguards for parole revocations and for probation revocations set
out by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer 0 and in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli"l were generally applicable to disciplinary proceedings
within the prison.' 2
Pursuant to a petition for certiorari,' 3 the Supreme Court af-
firmed in part the court of appeal's decision. The Court agreed that
due process rights attached, 4 but declined to follow the court of ap-
peals and adopt the full range of procedures established by Morris-
sey and Gagnon.15 Instead, the Court felt that the "closed, tightly
controlled environment" in which prison disciplinary proceedings take
place, the special security problems of prisons, and the necessity for
flexibility in the correctional process warranted reduced procedures' 6
and thus held that due process required only that an inmate be
given: (1) notice of the charges and a brief period of at least twen-
8. McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 628 (D. Neb. 1972). The district
court relied on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 443
F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), denying due process in parole
revocation proceedings. Subsequent to the district court's decision in McDonnell but
prior to court of appeals action, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit in Morrissey and held that due process was required in the parole revocation
situation.
9. McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1973).
10. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
12. The court of appeals remanded the case to allow the district court to determine
whether Nebraska's procedures met due process and to grant the permissible relief. 483
F.2d at 1064. The court of appeals held that the restoration of good-time credits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was foreclosed under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973), but suggested that any determinations of misconduct made in proceedings which
failed to comport with due process could be expunged from prison records. 483 F.2d
at 1064. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals about Preiser's foreclosure
of restoration of good-time credits as a remedy under section 1983. 418 U.S. at 555.
However, the Court disagreed with and reversed the court of appeal's application of due
process retroactively that would have allowed the expunging of the prison record. Id.
at 573 The Court said,
Despite the fact that procedures are related to the integrity of the fact-finding
process, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, where less is generally at
stake for an individual than at a criminal trial, great weight should be given
to the significant impact a retroactivity ruling would have on the administra-
tion of all prisons in the country, and the reliance prison officials placed, in
good faith, on prior law not requiring such procedures.
Id. at 573-74.
13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
14. 418 U.S. at 558.
15. Id. at 560.
16. Id. at 560-63.
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ty-four hours to prepare a defense;17 (2) the opportunity "to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when per-
mitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals";' 8 and (3) "a 'written statement of the
factfindings as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons' for the
disciplinary action taken."' 9  The Court specifically denied inmates
the rights of confrontation and cross-examination 20 and the aid of
either retained or appointed counsel. 21 However, the Court did re-
quire substitute aid by fellow inmates or staff personnel-at least
"[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the com-
plexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to
collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate compre-
hension of the case ... *22 Finally, the Court held that hearing
boards composed solely of prison officials could be sufficiently im-
partial to satisfy due process.2
THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PRocEss
Today, it is axiomatic that inmates in state institutions continue
to enjoy many constitutional protections, including due process of law,
after incarceration.24 The question in Wolff, therefore, was not
whether prisoners retain the protections of due process generally, but
whether the protections of the due process clause extend to proceed-
ings in which prisoners may be confined in a disciplinary cell or
lose good-time credits.2
The general standard for determining when due process rights
attach has been first to determine whether the private interest that
is to be adversely affected is a protected interest and, if so, to deter-
mine if loss of the interest will be "grievious." Once it is clear that
17. Id. at 564.
18. Id. at 566.
19. Id. at 564, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
20. Id. at 567-68.
21. Id. at 570.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 571.
24. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (religious freedom);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (due process); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) (due process); Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam) (access to the courts); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (access to the courts); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)
(protection against invidious discrimination); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per
curiam) (religious freedom).
25. 418 U.S. at 557.
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the individual stands to suffer a grievous injury to a protected
interest, due process rights must be granted unless, on balance, the
governmental interest in summary proceedings outweighs the possible
lOSS.26
Applying the general standard, the Wolff Court conceded that good-
time credit is not constitutionally required but instead is a state-created
right.2 7  Nevertheless, the Court felt that once the state had given the
right, "the prisoner's interest has real substance and is . . . em-
braced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' .. "..28 Having
found a protected interest, the Court held that "[tihe deprivation of
good-time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance"29
and that the deprivation was sufficient, on balance, to require the
protections of due process.30  In the case of confinement in a discip-
linary cell the Court held, "as in the case of good-time, there should
be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary de-
termination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction." 1
The Court reached this decision because it felt the "major change in
the conditions of confinementf '' 2 that accompanies solitary confine-
ment is "difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distin-
guish . . . [from when] . . . good-time is forfeited ... .
Arguably, the Court's reasoning will also reach other penalties
imposed for serious misbehavior 34 such as revocation of a parole re-
lease date35 or reduction of a conduct "grade."36  The revocation or
modification of a parole release date may postpone an inmate's re-
lease on parole and, thereby, increase his time of confinement. A
reduction in a conduct "grade" could result in a significant change in
the conditions of confinement by causing transfer to a more maxi-
26. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. 418 U.S. at 557.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 561.
30. Id. at 557.
31. Id. at 571 n.19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 581 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Parole release dates are dates, set by statute, upon which an imnate becomes
eligible to have his case for parole heard. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (Supp.
1974).
36. The North Carolina corrections system provides for the classification of pris-
oners on the basis of conduct as either "honor" grade, "A" grade, or "B" grade and for
the reduction of grade as punishment for "major" misconduct. GuIDEBOOm, supra note
2, §§ 2-101, -408(4).
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mum security institution and by terminating the inmate's eligibility
for work-release programs or other activities outside the prison. 37
The inmate's interest in avoiding either of these penalties seems to be
of sufficient substance to require due process before their imposi-
tion.
38
THE ELEMENTS OF DuE PROCESS
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls [only] for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."3' 9 In Wolff the Su-
preme Court declined to apply the Morrissey-Gagnon procedures for
prison disciplinary proceedings.40  This decision was based on a per-
ceived distinction between disciplinary proceedings and parole and
probation revocations and on the unique "stake the State has in the
structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing."'"
The distinction between revocation proceedings and disciplinary
proceedings lies in the immediacy of the loss to be suffered.4 2 While
the revocation of parole or probation will result in the immediate loss
of freedom and the return to prison, "[t]he deprivation [of good-time]
...does not then and there work any change in the conditions of
[the prisoner's] liberty. It can postpone the date of eligibility for
parole and extend the maximum term to be served, but it is not
certain to do so, for good-time may be restored. 43  With respect to
the revocation of good-time, a reduction in the required procedures
may be justified on the basis of this distinction. However, a reduc-
tion in procedures seems less justified when the punishment imposed
is confinement in a disciplinary cell. In this situation, the loss is
just as immediate and, arguably, just as serious as the revocation of
parole or probation.
The state's interest in maintaining order within its prisons and
"in furthering the institutional goal of modifying the behavior and
value systems of prison inmates sufficiently to permit them to live
37. Prisoners in the North Carolina corrections system are eligible for work-release
privileges only while they maintain "honor" grade. Id. § 3-201.
38. In Jackson v. Wise, 43 U.S.L.W. 2272 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1974), a federal
district court held that due process is required before an inmate's parole release date can
be rescinded or modified in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
39. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
40. 418 U.S. at 560.
41. Id. at 561.
42. Id. at 560-61.
43. Id. at 561.
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within the law when they are released . . . ." is the major reason
given by the Court for not adopting the Morrissey-Gagnon proce-
dures.44  The validity of this rationale can be effectively analyzed
only in conjunction with a discussion of each of the procedural safe-
guards required in Morrissey and Gagnon.
Written Notice of the Claimed Violations
Wolff required "that written notice of the charges must be given
to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the
charges and to enable him to marshall the facts and prepare a de-
fense. ' 45 To insure that the ability to prepare a defense is not denied
de facto, the Court also required that "a brief period of time after the
notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to pre-
pare . ...
One purpose of notice is to clarify the charges, 47 and it is ques-
tionable whether written notice of a named violation, without more,
will satisfy this objective. Some correctional systems presently pun-
ish inmates for violations such as "agitation" and the use of "pro-
fane, contemptuous or threatening" language. 48 An inmate charged
with such conduct is often unaware of the factual nature of the wrong-
doing with which he is charged. A solution that would enable an in-
mate, upon receipt of notice, better to understand both the nature
and implications of the charge lodged against him would be to re-
quire that inmates be given, upon entering prison, a written, unam-
biguous delineation of the acts that constitute violations of prison
rules and regulations and of the punishments that may be imposed
for such acts. Arguably, due process compels this procedure to avoid
vagueness. 40 The further step by prison authorities of providing all
incoming inmates with an orientation to prison rules and regulations
would also be helpful in this context.
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. Id. at 564. The right to written notice of the claimed violations was also re-
quired in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
46. 418 U.S. at 564. Arguably, twenty-four hours is not long enough since the
inmate may be required to continue his normal working duties and other prison respon-
sibilities for a large part of this period. It should be remembered, however, that the
Court set only a minimum period. State prison authorities are free to give more than
twenty-four hours advance notice if they desire.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., GUmEBOOK, supra note 2, §§ 2-301(12), -302(1).
49. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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Disclosure to the Inmate of the Evidence Against Him
Wolff did not explicitly require that the disciplinary defendant
be given a summary of the evidence against him prior to the hear-
ig. Arguably, the Court intended that such a summary be part of
the notice of charges since the notice contemplated by the Court is
"to give the charged party a chance to marshall the facts in his de-
fense and to clarify what the charges are, in fact."50  Notice suffi-
cient to meet this standard would necessarily have to include a sum-
mary of the evidence since mere notice of a named violation would
in no way relate the factual basis for the charges or apprise the in-
mate of the allegations he must rebut in his defense.
The only interest the State could have for denying disclosure
of the evidence against an inmate would be that of insuring the
safety of an anonymous inmate "informer." Disclosure of the in-
mate accuser's identity either directly or indirectly through too much
detail could result in retaliation against the "squealer."51  This dan-
ger would seem to be present in only a small minority of disciplinary
proceedings since most violations are reported by correctional offi-
cials, not fellow inmates. 52  Thus, the right to disclosure of the evi-
dence should be required in all cases except those in which prison
authorities justify its denial in writing.
Opportunity to be Heard in Person and to Present Witnesses and
Documentary Evidence
The opportunity to be heard in person is presumed, 3 and the
right to present witnesses and documentary evidence is explicitly
granted by Wolff with some limitation.54 In the Court's words, "the
inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call wit-
nesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when per-
mitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals." 55
50. 418 U.S. at 564. The right to disclosure of the evidence against the accused
was also required in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
51. Wolff generally recognized this concern by its reference to "the unwritten code
that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner." 418 U.S. at 562.
52. Id. at 587 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. No other conclusion could explain the Court's continued references to "tho
hearing." See, e.g., id. at 561.
54. Id. at 566. The opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence was also required in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
55. 418 U.S. at 566.
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The importance of the opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence cannot be denied. "This gives the accused the
opportunity to corroborate his own version of events, to prove an alibi
defense, and in general to overcome his captors' suspicions as to his
veracity by reason of his substantial interest in the outcome of the
proceedings."56  Furthermore, "[t]he right to present the testimony
of impartial witnesses and real evidence . . . is particularly crucial
to an accused inmate, who obviously faces a severe credibility prob-
lem when trying to disprove the charges of a prison guard.
5 7
However, just as the importance of the opportunity to call wit-
nesses and present evidence cannot be denied, the state's interests
in denying that opportunity in certain cases can not be ignored.
Wolff recognized two major state interests-institutional safety and
correctional goals-which could justify denial of the opportunity to
call witnesses and present evidence.
58
The threat to prison safety caused by the unrestricted right to
call witnesses is real. For example, witnesses could be used by in-
mates to subvert the efforts of authorities to maintain order by the
separation of subversive elements. In addition, there may be cases in
which the testimony of a particular witness could reveal, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the identity of an anonymous informant and
thereby create a risk of reprisal. In these situations prison officials
must be able to deny the opportunity to call witnesses in order to in-
sure the safety of staff personnel and other inmates within the insti-
tution.
Furtherance of correctional goals is more difficult to justify as a
reason for denying the opportunity to call witnesses and to present
evidence. The Court cites the need for the "swift and sure" discip-
lining of some inmates as a general justification for reduced proce-
dural safeguards in prison disciplinary proceedings.59 This proposi-
tion seems totally without merit.60 Allowing an inmate to call a rea-
56. Herman, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana, & Harvey, Due Process in Prison Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings: Meyens v. Alldredge, 29 GtUmD PRAc. 79, 87 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Herman].
57. 418 U.S. at 583 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id. at 563.
60. "Almost all major penologists recognize that an open and fair administrative
process contributes to prisoner rehabilitation and institutional harmony." Hirschkop &
Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795, 830 (1969).
In addition it is -thought that, "speedy punishment, unless fairly and justly imposed, will
1975]
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sonable number of witnesses and present a reasonable amount of doc-
umentary evidence will cause only slightly more delay in the imposi-
tion of punishment than will result from the required advance notice
of the charges61 and the required hearing.62 Furthermore, prison
authorities can effectively limit the number of witnesses and amount
of evidence through their power to exclude irrelevant and repetitious
matters.
When terms as broad as institutional safety and correctional
goals are used to define discretion given state officials, the possibil-
ity of arbitrary action exists. One means of reducing this possibility
is to require state officials to justify their actions in writing. Wolff
suggested this technique but did not require it.03  It should be noted,
however, that the only apparent state interest for not giving written
justifications is one of avoiding the cost and inconvenience that ac-
company any additional paperwork. Surely this is not a significant
enough interest to outweigh the need to control arbitrary action.
The Right to Confront and Cross-examine Adverse Witnesses
The rights of confrontation and cross-examination have been
held essential in criminal trials6 4 and in other types of cases "where
governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reason-
ableness of the action depends on fact findings.""5  Mr. Justice Mar-
shall in his dissent from Wolff argued that
confrontation and cross-examination are as crucial in the prison
discriplinary context as in any other, if not more so. Prison disci-
plinary proceedings will invariably turn on disputed questions of
fact . . . and, in addition to the usual need for cross-examination
to reveal mistakes of identity, faulty perceptions, or cloudy mem-
ories, there is a significant potential for abuse of the disciplinary
process by "persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intoler-
ance, prejudice or jealously," . . . whether these be other in-
mates seeking revenge or prison guards seeking to vindicate their
otherwise absolute power over the men under their control.00
not only fail to serve as a deterrent to similar conduct but will also counter efforts at
rehabilitation." Herman, supra note 56, at 88.
61. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
62. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
63. 418 U.S. at 566.
64. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
65. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); accord, Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. 418 U.S. at 585-86.
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Despite these persuasive arguments in favor of allowing confrontation
and cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, the major-
ity in Wolff felt that the state's interests outweighed the inmate's and,
thus, they denied these rights in all cases.
67
In analyzing the policies supporting the denial of confrontation
and cross-examination it is helpful to distinguish between two possible
situations: first, where the accused inmate seeks to confront and cross-
examine a previously anonymous inmate informant; secondly, where
the accused inmate seeks to confront and cross-examine a known in-
mate informant or a prison official who is the accusing party.
In the first situation the majority felt that the "high risk of re-
prisals" that would result from disclosure of an inmate informer's
identity justified the denial of confrontation and cross-examination. 8
This reasoning is sound because a contrary holding would effectively
end all inmate cooperation in the disciplinary process. However, to
guard against the abuses envisioned by Mr. Justice Marshall 9 it would
be helpful for the disciplinary hearing board to examine the inmate
informant to test his credibility.
The denial of confrontation and cross-examination is less easily
justifiable when the accuser is a prison official or a known inmate
informant. The majority conceded that fewer dangers arise in this
context than in the anonymous inmate informant situation. 0 Yet
they declined to require confrontation and cross-examination, choosing
to "leave these matters to the sound discretion of the officials of state
prisons." 7'
Traditionally, two arguments have been made to support the de-
nial of the right of confrontation and cross-examination of prison
guards.
First, . . . if inmates -are given the right to confront accusers, who
are usually prison guards, then these guards must appear at hearings
instead of performing security functions. This would necessitate
significant diversion of security resources. Second, allowing in-
mates adversarial rights will erode the traditional inmate-staff rela-
tionship by placing inmates and staff on the same level for a brief
period of time.
72
67. Id. at 567-68.
68. Id. at 568.
69. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
70. 418 U.S. at 568.
71. Id. at 569.
72. Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The
Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REv. 27, 45 (1971).
1975]
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Assuming that hearings could not be held when the services of the
guard were not required, the time the guard spends attending the
hearing must be balanced against the value of confrontation and
cross-examination as methods for discovering truth and determining
credibility. Surely, requiring one guard to leave his duties for a
short time to testify will not significantly reduce security within the
prison. If it does, the state should be required to provide additional
personnel. In any case, the possible inconvenience and additional
costs of requiring confrontation and cross-examination should not out-
weigh the need for ascertaining the truth.73
The factual basis of the second argument is unclear. The Presi-
dent's Task Force Report on Corrections found, to the contrary, "that
staff control can be greatest . . . if rules regulating behavior are as
close as possible to those which would be essential for law and order
in any free community . . . . 74 "More important is the fact that
authority premised only on power and an avoidance of any outside
scrutiny is not worth preserving, particularly at the expense of a pris-
oner's right to a legitimate search for truth at the hearing. '76
Wolff seemed to rely primarily on a third "danger" to justify de-
nial of confrontation and cross-examination-"the resentment which
may persist after confrontation. ' 6  However, since the accused in-
mate already knows who the accusing party is, it seems unlikely that
his resentment would be significantly increased by confrontation. In
fact the possibility of increased resentment that might occur as a re-
sult of harsh, vindictive questioning could be controlled either by the
hearing board or by interposing a counsel substitute.77
Upon examinatibn, the denial of confrontation and cross-ex-
amination appears justified only in cases in which the accuser is an
anonymous inmate informant. Nevertheless, Wolff has allowed this
rare situation'to set the rule for the more common situation in which
a prison guard presses the charges. As Mr. Justice Marshall states in
his dissent, "[tlhis is surely permitting the tail to wag the constitu-
73. "It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that fundamental constitu-
tional rights may not be sacrificed in the interest of administrative and fiscal efficiency."
Id. at 44. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965).
74. CoRlEc'roNs, supra note 3, at 50.
75. Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for
Specific Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D.L. Rnv. 309, 324 (1973).
76. 418 U.S. at 569.
77. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
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tional dog."178  A more satisfactory solution would be to require con-
frontation and cross-examination except in cases where the danger to
the witness is overwhelming in the eyes of the hearing board.79
A "Neutral and Detached" Hearing Body
Wolff held that the Nebraska hearing board, which was made
up exclusively of prison officials, was sufficiently impartial to satisfy
due process requirements.8 0 This finding is clearly limited to the
facts of Wolff and, thus, does not set the standard for all hearing
boards.8 ' However, since due process does require an impartial hear-
ing 2 and since this "is a particularly difficult requirement to satisfy
within the confines of a closed institution,"8 the problems of allowing
prison officials to judge the conduct of inmates must be examined.
In a small, closed institution . . . staff members are familiar
with many of the inmates and usually bring to the Board hearings
a great deal of personal knowledge about a particular inmate and
sometimes bias, either favorable or unfavorable, toward him. The
result often is that the disciplinary decision is made on the basis of
-the personal and usually unarticulated feelings of a staff member,
rather than on the facts presented at the hearing.
Board members may not act impartially because they feel that
their duty is to support the staff in all cases. As one Board member
put it, "[t]he philosophy in the past has been always back up your
officers, whether they are right or wrong." Such a view is particu-
larly harmful to the integrity of the disciplinary process, when, as
in most contested hearings, the evidence consists mainly of conflict-
ing testimony by the pnsoner and a staff member.
Another factor which may affect the disposition of the case
is the inmate's behavior before the Board. An inmate who is
"defiant" or had a "hard attitude" or insists on his "rights" is un-
likely to win the sympathy of the Board.
84
These factors substantiate the view that prison staff personnel
cannot be impartial when judging inmates. However, upon exami-
78. 418 U.S. at 587.
79. A requirement that denials be justified in writing would prevent this exception
from swallowing the rule and would reduce the "great litigation and attendant costs,"
feared by the majority. Id. at 569.
80. 418 U.S. at 570-71. A "neutral and detached" hearing body was also required
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
81. See 418 U.S. at 570-71.
82. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
83. Wick, supra note 75, at 323-24.
84. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, fudicial Intervention in Prison Discipline,
63 J. C iM. L. & C. 200, 210 (1972).
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nation, the only viable alternative-bringing in "outsiders" to sit on
hearing boards85-is even less desirable. "Outsiders" should not be
paid since if the state pays them they could become as entrenched in
the system as other staff personnel. Persons who would volunteer to
serve would likely be those community citizens with the most interest
in and concern about the correctional system. They could be as bi-
ased in favor of prisoners as the hearing board might be against
them. True, these "outsiders" would probably not have personal
knowledge about individual inmates but neither would they have the
personal knowledge of prison life that is valuable in judging credi-
bility.
Most importantly, if "outsiders" were allowed to impose disci-
plinary sanctions on inmates there would be a separation of author-
ity from responsibility, which would reduce morale among the prison
staff and which might encourage arbitrary action. If prison guards
felt a group of "outsiders" who didn't understand prison life would be
scrutinizing their every move, they might be inclined to avoid the dis-
ciplinary process altogether "either by disciplining the inmates infor-
mally or by ignoring infractions of the prison rules. '80
The best solution may be to leave both the authority and the re-
sponsibility for prison discipline with prison officials. At the same
time, the possibilities for bias could be reduced by preventing those
persons from serving on the board who have participated in the in-
vestigation of the case, are witnesses, are charged with subsequent
review, have personal knowledge of a material fact, have prior in-
volvement with the accused, or have a personal interest in the out-
come.8
7
A Written Statement by the Factfinders of the Evidence Relied on and
Reasons for the Disciplinary Action Taken
Wolff held that there must be a written statement of the the evi-
dence relied on and reasons for the action taken. 8  This requirement
85. Wick, supra note 75, at 324.
86. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 84, at 209.
87. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1084 (M.D. Fla. 1973). This
standard could be met by bringing in staff from other parts of the prison complex who
have duties which would not put them in as close contact with the prisoners as guards.
Such a group might include administrators and counselors.
88. 418 U:S. at 564. A written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action taken was also required in Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 489.
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insures that inmates will be protected "against collateral conse-
quences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original
proceeding."8 9 In addition, a written record of the proceedings gives
inmates the reasons for their winning or losing and, thus, instills
confidence in the system. 90 The Court recognized that there may be
a need to exclude certain items of evidence in some cases91 but, in
general, it perceived "no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect
of prison disruption that can flow from the requirement of these state-
ments."92
Right to Counsel or Counsel Substitute
The Court in Wolff denied the right -to retained or appointed
counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings.93 In denying this right,
the Court relied on the effect counsel would have on the nature of
the proceedings and on the practical problems of delay and in-
creased costs.94 The insertion of counsel was viewed as giving "the
proceedings a more adversary cast . . . ,,. This surely would be
the result since counsel are "bound by professional duty to present all
available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions
and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views."9
However, the Court failed to answer the question of whether an
adversary hearing is necessarily evil. Surely such a hearing would
insure a fairer presentation of the facts and would enhance the search
for truth. In addition, the interposition of counsel would reduce the
resentment the Court feared would result from allowing confronta-
tion.97 On the other hand, adversary proceedings could reduce the
ability of disciplinary boards to accomplish correctional goals. The
hearing would become a win or lose situation with little room for re-
habilitative compromise. Furthermore, the problems of morale and
the tendency to avoid the disciplinary process which were discussed
in relation to the use of "outsiders" on hearing boards would again
be raised if outside counsel were allowed.9"
89. 418 U.S. at 565.
90. See Wick, supra note 75, at 325.
91. 418 U.S. at 565.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 570. The right to counsel or counsel substitute was required in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
94. 418 U.S. at 569-70, quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
95. 418 U.S. at 570.
96. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
97. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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The arguments both for and against counsel are persuasive when
the effect on the nature of the proceeding is all that is considered.
However, the practical concerns of delay and increased cost tip the
scale in favor of the denial of retained or appointed counsel. More
questions will be asked, objections made, and rulings required when
counsel is present. As a result the record will become more detailed
and, thus, require additional time to prepare. Increased cost will en-
sue from the use of appointed counsel for indigent inmates and coun-
sel for the state.99 In addition, the lengthened disciplinary process
will require additional personnel and facilities for its operation.
Having denied retained and appointed counsel to the disciplinary-
action defendant, the Court held that substitute aid from either staff
personnel or other inmates must be provided "[w]here an illiterate in-
mate is involved or where the complexity of the issue makes it
unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evi-
dence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case .... 010
The use of staff personnel as counsel substitutes presents problems.
Staff members are put in the position of representing inmates against
fellow staff members. If they become strong advocates for inmates
they may be criticized by their fellow workers and if they don't they
may not be effective aid to the inmates.101
The alternative of allowing inmates to act as substitute counsel
is no better. Inmate represenatives may use the hearing as an op-
portunity to express their own feelings and frustrations. Such activity
would reduce the effectiveness of the aid and could damage the ac-
cused's case. In addition, there is the danger that a few inmates
may be able to control who can get help and how much those who
get it must pay for it. In spite of the problems that may arise in
a substitute aid plan, and particularly in view of the inmates' need for
assistance, counsel substitutes appear to be the best available solution.
CONCLUSION
The promise of due process given by Wolff is a welcomed step
toward the protection of prisoners' fights. However, "[i]t is an empty
promise to guarantee fairness while omitting the tools necessary to ac-
complish that fairness. ' 0 2
99. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
100. 418 U.S. at 570.
101. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 84, at 208.
102. Millemann, supra note 72, at 50.
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The Court's provisions for notice of the charges, opportunity to
call witnesses and to present real evidence, and a written record of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the action taken'0 ' are crucial to
a fair hearing and their importance must not be ignored. The effec-
tiveness of these procedures for insuring fairness, however, is dimin-
ished by the denial of confrontation and cross-examination.
First, although notice is required in part to "enable [the inmate]
to marshal the facts and prepare a defense,""', "[a]bsent confronta-
tion and cross-examination, . . . the party proceeded against is with-
out knowledge of the adverse evidence and cannot, therefore . . .
make his defense."'1 5 Furthermore, without the chance to "challenge
the word of his accusers" 10 6 given by the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, it will be considerably more difficult for the pris-
oner to "'explain away the accusation' ,'07 since he cannot show
mistake by the other party. Finally, even the most impartial hearing
board cannot fairly judge credibility, nor accurately determine which
version of the disputed facts is true if one side in the contest is not
even questioned.0 8
THOMAS WARREN Ross
Labor Law-Organizational Rights of Managerial Employees
In 1970 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) abruptly de-
parted from the position it had maintained throughout its history on the
status of managerial employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' Traditionally, the Board had excluded from bargaining
units and from coverage by the Act, all employees whom it identified
as managerial,2 even though these employees were never statutorily ex-
103. 418 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 564.
105. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
106. 418 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086 (M.D. Fla. 1973), quoting Es-
coe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
108. 418 U.S. at 582.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
2. For a history of the status of managerial employees see NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275-90 (1974).
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